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Abstract 
 
The paper presents a summarised chronology of the controversy surrounding the use of 
fraudulent handheld molecular detectors in Mexico, as well as the responses to the 
controversy from three critical sectors: the Mexican media, the different government 
branches and national scientific institutions. The paper also includes interview 
material with the most prominent critics and of the molecular detectors in Mexico and 
compares the voices of ‘scientific activists’ with the institutional responses. Finally, an 
analysis of all these different responses to the controversy is made, along with a short 
discussion of the relevance for expertise studies, as well as a critique of the application 
of existing expertise frameworks in developing country contexts such as Mexico’s. 
 
 
 
A brief history of molecular detectors 
 
Since the early 1990s, several devices marketed as handheld molecular detectors or using 
similar monikers began to be marketed in the police, security, rescue and military 
equipment market around the world. In 1993, after warnings from several law 
enforcement agents who had documented the widespread use of these seemingly 
miraculous apparatuses which were in fact nothing more than dowsing rods marketed 
under a veil of pseudoscientific jargon, the US government indicted the manufacturers of 
the earliest MD models – known as the Quadro Tracker – and subsequently banned their 
sale in the USA. Three years later the company was served with an injunction, based on 
the argument that one of the critical electronic chips which was supposed to make the 
detectors function could not be shown to work under accepted scientific principles even 
though the Quadro was being marketed as top-of-the-line scientifically backed 
equipment.1 
 In the following decade several other devices, some of them identical to the 
Quadro Tracker (excepting minor cosmetic differences) appeared under different brand 
names in the USA and Europe and were marketed all around the world, but particularly 
to non-developed countries; the Quadro is still sold today but only as a golf-ball search 
device in novelty shops. Others include the MOLE Programmable Detection System 	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manufactured by Global Technical Ltd in the UK, the DKL Lifeguard manufactured in 
the USA by the Electroscope Company for search and rescue missions by ‘detecting 
human heartbeats’ and the Sniffex manufactured between 2005 and 2008 by various 
American companies but now distributed by German company Unival; Unival also 
markets the HEDD1 detector, a new iteration of the Sniffex. Finally, two other detectors 
that have received much media attention are the ADE-651 detector made by UK-based 
ATSC and the GT-200 detector, also manufactured by Global Technical. Other British-
manufactured detectors exist such as the Alpha 6, XK9, ADE-101, ADE-650 and ADE-
651 along with other lesser-known models. The principal ‘families’ of detectors are 
outlined in the table below along with the ‘underlying scientific principle’ that the 
manufacturers claim makes each device work: 
 
 
Detector family Alleged underlying scientific principle 
Quadro tracker/MOLE Substance-specific oscillating electric fields. 
DKL Lifeguard Detection of dielectrophoresic electric fields. 
Sniffex/HEDD1 Modulation of magnetic fields. 
Alpha 6/ ADE-651 Resonating magnetic fields. 
GT-200 Dia- and para-magnetic field sensing. 
Table 1: Molecular detector 'families' 
Scientific testing of MD devices 
 
The Quadro Tracker affair in the USA caused journalists to take some notice of molecular 
detectors turning the whole episode into a minor press scandal.2 The device had been put 
to use in the field by police agencies, in airport security stations and in schools until an 
FBI agent was alerted of the device’s extensive use in law enforcement and security 
departments throughout the country. This alert to the FBI then led to an official 
investigation and a thorough testing at Sandia National Laboratories in 1996, which 
found the device was nothing but an empty plastic box with an aerial antennae attached 
and no working electronics inside. This gave rise to fraud charges and an injunction 
against the manufacturer, a trial and indictments against their sale. The FBI also issued a 
nationwide alert against the use of fraudulent and bogus detectors. 
The DKL Lifeguard 2 detector was subject to a double-blind test at Sandia 
National laboratories in early 1998 after the FBI was alerted that it was being advertised 
as a tool for search & rescue missions.3 The double-blind Sandia test concluded, “the 
device performs no better than random chance” (Murray et al 1998). The manufacturers 
did not permit a destructive physical evaluation by Sandia, but the report clearly stated 
that although the existence of the dielectrophoresic fields which the manufacturers 
claimed to detect are a scientifically sound phenomenon, the idea that these weak fields 
could cause the detectors antenna to swivel without an outside power source was “clearly 
wrong”. Other ‘scientific principles’ claimed to make the device operate as found in the 
manufacturer’s literature were also considered to be mistakenly quoted to explain the 
device’s functioning. The FBI again closed the controversy in the US by issuing a 
nationwide warning to “the Emergency Medical Services, Search and Rescue, and law-
enforcement communities” stemming from the Sandia results (Conover 2012). 
In 2002 Sandia National Laboratories were again called up, this time to test the 
MOLE detector, which was being marketed – along with many other uses – as a bomb 
detection device after the MOLE was brought to the attention of the Rocky Mountain 
office of the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center. The Sandia 
report again concluded that “based on statistical analysis of the double-blind test results, 
the MOLE performs no better than a random selection process” (Murray 2002). Sandia 
also noted on the report that the MOLE detector was an almost exact physical copy of 
the banned Quadro Tracker that had been examined previously by the same team, albeit 
with different product labelling and a different non-removable setup for the 
‘programming chip’. 
The Sniffex device, manufactured in Bulgaria but marketed from the US, was 
turn tested by the US Navy’s Counter Terrorism Technology Task Force in August 2005 
in a two day series of double-blind trials with four Navy-owned detectors. The results 
were definitive with the Navy test team reporting that “the SNIFFEX handheld explosive 
detector does not work. The vendor failed to make good on any guarantee of the device’s 
performance and provided no possible reason as to why the SNIFFEX was unable to 
perform as marketed”.4 
 
The ADE-651 and the GT-200 
 
The ADE-651 and its derivative iterations were subject to scrutiny and severe criticism by 
US government aids and journalistic media and also from other public voices. Magician 
and ‘scientific sceptic’ spokesperson James Randi issued one of his famous public 
challenges with a US$1 million purse against ADE-651 manufacturers if they could prove 
the device worked through his James Randi Educational Foundation, which helped to 
increase the visibility of the controversy; the challenge was never answered by the 
manufacturer.5 
On 22 January, 2010, BBC’s Newsnight featured an investigative report on the 
ADE-651, prompted by the extensive use of the device for bomb detection in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, two locations where numerous British military forces were staged at the 
time. Newsnight consulted British scientists who showed that the devices were clearly 
hoaxes, and concentrated on the danger that using fake ‘explosive detectors’ meant for 
the Iraq and Afghanistan troops. 6  After the show aired, the UK government took 
immediate action, banning all export of these and other bogus MD devices, albeit only to 
Iraq and Afghanistan as the purpose of the ban was to prevent danger to British troops. 
The UK government stressed that the export ban was only applicable to Iraq and 
Afghanistan as these were the only territories where it had legal powers to enforce it, but 
that the Foreign Office would send out a warning about devices like the ADE-651 and 
the GT-200 (Hawley and Jones 2010b) to all governments. 
The warning was put forward on 5 January, 2010, yet Newsnight also reported 
that the it had been since March 2009 that the Foreign Office had been aware of the 
devices’ inefficacy and yet the Iraq government had not been warned about it until 
November of that year. There were further concerns by some MPs that it was not until 
the Newsnight investigation shed light on the affair that the export ban was considered 
(Hawley and Jones 2010c), although no serious investigations seem to have been made. 
Newsnight was also told that between 2001 and 2004 elements from the Royal Engineers 
had been hired to promote the device at arms fairs around the globe (Hawley and Jones 
2011), and in fact the GT200 had long been advertised by the manufacturers as officially 
tested and sponsored by the Royal Engineers. Although the British armed forces never 
promoted the device institutionally, there is evidence that Royal Engineer teams did have 
carry out tests of the device at RE installations and gave a very favourable assessment of 
its ‘efficacy’.7 
To date, a sizeable proportion of bogus molecular detector marketers and 
manufacturers have been have been formally charged of fraud in the UK. Jim 
McCormick, president of ATSC, which manufactures the ADE-651, was arrested by 
British authorities on January 2010 on suspicion of fraud by misrepresentation8 and 
charged with “six charges under the Fraud Act of 2006”, “three counts for possessing or 
having under his control a device for the use in the course of or in connection with the 
fraud” and a final “three counts of manufacturing or supplying the device knowing it was 
designed to be used in the commission of a fraud” in July of 2012, according to Avon 
and Somerset Police Superintendent N. Rock; the charges are related to the ADE-101, 
the ADE-650 and the ADE-651.9 Fraud charges have also been brought up by the City 
of London Police after being authorised by the Crown Prosecution Service on six Fraud 
Act counts against Global Technical president Gary Bolton related to the GT-200 device, 
“which it is alleged was dishonestly represented as capable of detecting explosives”.10 
Three other persons were charged relating to the Alpha 6 device and one other relating to 
the XK9 detector. 
 
Molecular detectors in the Third World 
 
Despite bans and fraud convictions in the US and UK where the devised originate, and 
the numerous warnings by the American government regarding fraudulent molecular 
detectors and the UK governments later alerts, the devices were and are still sold to 
numerous security agencies and armed forces around the world, particularly the Third 
World. Two cases must be mentioned because of the tragic consequences due to usage of 
fraudulent detectors, Iraq and Taiwan. 
The Iraqi government is reported to have spent over USD $85 million in ADE-
651 detectors. Yet despite the UK government’s 2010 warnings and the overwhelming 
scientific trials that cast doubt on the legitimacy of the devices, the Iraqi government did 
not immediately stop using them. Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani argued that in fact 
the GT-200 had detected over 700 car bombs, even while the director of ATSC, the 
device’s manufacturer, was being detained on suspicion of fraud by misrepresentation by 
British authorities.11 
The New York Times reported how in one car-bomb blast that killed 155 people, 
the vehicle had to pass at least one checkpoint where the ADE-651 was being used for 
certain.12 Tragically, top-level Iraqi commands continuously refused to heed any of the 
warnings or expert test results, in a pattern that has repeated itself over and over in other 
underdeveloped countries where multi-million fraudulent detector purchases were made. 
In 2009 Iraqi Major General Jehad al-Jabiri, head of the Ministry of the Interior’s 
General Directorate for Combating Explosives was reported by the NYT as declaring 
about the detectors: 
 
“Whether it’s magic or scientific, what I care about is it detects bombs”. 
 
 And when confronted by the scientific evidence against the devices, the Major General 
responded: 
 
“I don’t care about Sandia or the Department of Justice or any of them. I know more 
about this issue than the Americans do. In fact, I know more about bombs than 
anyone in the world.” 
 
It was not until 2011 that a major political response came about from the Iraqi 
government and al-Jabiri was arrested in relation to purchases of the ADE-651, this after 
hundreds of bomb-blast deaths in Baghdad; bombs that had magically eluded the 
detectors used at numerous checkpoints around the city. 13  By that time, the Iraqi 
government had spent over USD $122 million on the devices, purchasing them at an 
average of three times its already ridiculous asking price and amidst a huge corruption 
scandal that centred on al-Jabiri, who avoided any punishment through legal 
technicalities set up to protect top-level public servants from prosecution, though it was 
estimated that around 75% of the total reported cost for the Iraqi bogus MDs had in fact 
gone into corruption payments at the highest levels of government. 
 The case of Thailand is no less tragic although the bloodshed was apparently 
lesser than in the Iraqi case, and it was the GT-200 that was the Thai detector of choice. 
The international media reported that hundreds of people had been arrested or jailed 
based on military searches and raids carried out between 2007 and 2010 where use of the 
GT-200 had been central to ‘point out’ and convict ‘criminals’.14 Extremely worrying is 
that – as in the Iraqi case – despite the large evidence, activism and expert opinion 
against bogus MD use, the Thai military did not care about whether the device worked 
or not through accepted scientific principles, even though the device was also hailed as a 
piece of scientifically advanced technology. The News reports Colonel Pramote Promin, 
deputy spokesman for the Thailand Internal Security Operations Command, declaring 
 
“We found real evidence – guns, weapons, grenades– that's why we arrested 
them. It might be a hallucination but we found (weapons) many times. It might 
be a fluke or coincidence that it worked. [The device could work due to]  
‘something above science’.” 15 
 
Déjà vu. The Thai military staunchly held on to its version that the GT-200 was an 
effective piece of equipment despite all other opinions to the contrary and overwhelming 
scientific evidence disproving the device.16 In fact, Thai online activists were active in 
attempting to show how actual bogus MDs were only empty plastic boxes with a swivelling 
antenna on top.17 After mounting pressure, the Thailand government finally decided to 
run its own double-blind tests in early 2010, coming to the conclusion that the devices 
did not serve for detection purposes. Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva then declared, 
"we've done a double-blind test where the equipment was only successful in discovering 
in 20 percent of the cases, when just a random choice would give you 25 percent – so 
there's no statistical significance to having the equipment". 18  But despite these 
declarations and the Thai government’s announcement of possible legal action against 
Global Technical, one could still hear voices like those of Pornthip Rojanasunand, 
director of the Central Institute of Forensic Science saying,19 
 
"I know it's not scientific equipment, but forensic scientists can use it effectively. 
We won't buy more, but we won't stop using them either." 
  
 
The Mexican GT-200 telenovela 
 
The rest of the paper will centre on the Mexican case, where the GT-200, known 
in military circles as ‘La Ouija del Diablo’ (‘The Devil’s Ouija’) has been the most widely 
used bogus detector. According to estimates made by blogger activists using requests to 
the Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información (IFAI – Federal Institute for Information 
Access) along with other freedom of information channels, it is estimated that Mexican 
government agencies have spent at least $26 million dollars on bogus detectors, most of 
them GT200s.20 
The reach of the MD scam was not limited to the military but has spread to 
other federal and local agencies. Those duped by the molecular detector scam run the 
whole gamut of the Mexican political spectrum and are not only limited to the ruling 
PAN or the traditional PRI parties; newspapers have reported left-wing, progressive 
Mexico City Governor Marcelo Ebrard proudly showcasing the GT-200 as a 
technological tool for security sweeping of the massive Central de Abastos food market.21 
Documents from IFAI, press bulletins and other information portals confirm MDs have 
been purchased by various institutions at the both the federal and local levels, including 
the National Defence Ministry SEDENA (742 GT-200s), the PGR attorney general’s 
office (7 detectors), various Port Authorities (3 detectors), the Mexican Navy (102 GT-
200s), PEMEX (Mexican Petroleum state-owned company) through various sub agencies 
(54 detectors), the State Worker’s Social Security Institute ISSSTE (1 detector), the 
Colima state local government (3 ADE -651s), Sinaloa state local government (1 GT-
200), Michoacán state public security ministry (2 ADE-652s), Chihuahua state public 
security ministry (3 GT-200s), Guanajuato state public security ministry (5 GT-200s), 
Chiapas state judiciary office (5 GT-200s) and public security ministry (5 GT-200s), 
Mexico City public security ministry (3 GT-200s),  Mexico state public security ministry 
(26 GT-200s); the Federal Police uses GT200 apparently leant by SEDENA.22  
 When they first appeared, reports in the Mexican press about molecular detectors 
followed the Mexican Armed Forces press bulletins in hailing the GT-200 as a top-of-
the-line technological weapon against the drug cartels and organised crime syndicates, in 
the bloody ‘War on Drugs’ that started soon after currently outgoing president Felipe 
Calderón was sworn to office in 2006.23 Calderón’s hard-line, and highly controversial 
military-centred National Security Strategy has seen brutal crime-related violence, 
gruesome public body dumpings and high profile kidnappings increase to unprecedented 
levels. The cartel-related death toll has consistently grown to a mind-boggling official 
figure of nearly 60,000 dead since the beginning of Calderón’s presidency, partly as the 
cartel’s bloody response to the successful capture or killing of the majority of the 
Mexico’s leading drug lords by the Armed Forces, and partly as the result of an on-going 
inter-cartel territorial dispute.24 
The molecular detectors were initially presented by the press as the beginning of a 
miracle cure to the increasingly sophisticated methods used by the cartels to move drugs 
in and out of the country. In a piece entitled “New Defence Ministry weapon makes 
drug lords shake with fear”, the widely read newspaper Excélsior infamously reported25 
 
“[The GT-200] is a remote detection system […] which from 500 metres away is 
capable of detecting anything: dugs, explosives, firearms and money, without 
human intervention. This ‘Devil’s Ouija’ is a British invention which has been 
used in the UK for over nine years. It works through the detection of 
‘diamagnetic fields’ (which repel magnets) and ‘paramagnetic’ ones which are 
emitted by chemicals, plastics, uranium acetate, ammonium nitrate, and 
ammunition which made be built of bismuth, a lead substitute. […] The device, 
also capable of detecting human beings, tobacco and several toxins, weighs 450 
grams and is fed by user-generated static electricity, thus not requiring additional 
energy sources.” 
 
The article ended by noting, in a very humorous tone, how even the GT-200 could fail 
by reporting a curious incident where a shipment of cheese was mistaken for drugs, but 
no critical angle of this ‘mistake’ was deemed necessary. 
But the lack of a critical attitude was not limited to Excélsior. Newsgroup OEM – 
whose Sol nationwide syndicated periodicals are the highest read newspapers in the 
country – has continuously printed and to date still prints news of successful uses of the 
GT-200 by the Armed Forces, such as drug raids in Guanajuato state where the GT200 
is described as “sophisticated equipment” for the detection of “firearms, drugs, money 
and explosives”,26 use of the “technologically advanced device to find illicit objects” in 
poor neighbourhoods also in Guanajuato state,27 use of the GT-200 “explosive trace 
detector” during a high school bomb alert which gave a positive reading even though no 
explosives were found later by a K9 unit in Chihuahua state (no reasons are given for the 
false positive),28 a capture by the Army of nearly 500kg of marihuana “supported by the 
molecular detection device GT-200” in Oaxaca state, 29  capture of a massive illegal 
firearm and drug precursor shipment “detected using the GT-200 device” in Michoacán 
state”,30 amongst dozens of other articles that point out the great advantages that using 
the fraudulent detectors offers the federal and local authorities in raids, checkpoints, 
sweeps, detentions and searches that look to detain Mexico’s bloodiest criminals up and 
down the country. 
OEM’s on-going ‘journalistic’ travesty extends not only to mere reportages of the 
GT-200’s use, but even includes opinion pieces that openly praise the GT-200’s powers, 
going as far as hiding Global Technical’s 12-year history of frauds by portraying it as a 
respectable, well-established British company (such a piece was published one month 
after the BBC Newsnight scandal had erupted and the devices were being banned for 
export by the UK government, making it inconceivable that any serious journalist could 
be so ill-informed as to not realise this ‘mistake’). 31 
The severity of OEM’s continuous and continued misrepresentation of the GT-
200 – even to this day when the controversy of their use has blown up full steam in 
Mexico in other printed media – cannot be understated.32 Circulation numbers aside, 
OEM’s history of subservience to the oligarchic PRI political party makes it difficult to 
expect its newspapers to act as any sort of serious journalistic work, yet the sad fact 
remains that Mexico’s largest circulation newspaper has by openly negating any attempt 
at a balanced view regarding the detectors, aligned itself with the views of convicted 
international fraudsters. 
But other GT-200 praises are also found outside OEM’s servile newspapers. 
While coverage of molecular detectors is slim in other journalistic outlets compared to 
OEM even the media outlets that have recently taken up more critical voices have had 
serious slips. El Universal newspaper, Mexico’s most widely-read online newspaperwhich 
has been one of few critical media outlets through a handful of investigative works by L. 
Castellanos, also has featured reports that affirmed the GT-200’s astounding effectiveness 
unquestioningly. El Universal for example reported the GT-200’s utility in security 
monitoring task and detection of “firearms, explosives, drugs” and “even cocaine”, with 
“a radar that covers distances of up to 700 metres through earth and airspace” in 
Mexico’s City’s biggest markets33 and reported effective uses of the GT200 in mass grave 
searches, even though “scene contamination” had led to a fivefold overestimate of the 
number of bodies the previous day.34 Milenio newspaper – which ironically hosts an op-
ed by science populariser M. Bonfil who is one of the most vocal activists against the use 
of the GT-200 – in a very recent article has reported on the use of the detectors by the 
Mexican army thanks to the GT-200’s “capability to locate drugs and people through 
earth, water, gasoline, concrete, metal, lead and any other type of material”,35 and in an 
article criticised by Bonfil himself reported on the use of “top of the line technology to 
find bodies in unmarked graves” by the Durango state attorney general’s office.36 Even 
the hardline government-critical Proceso magazine did not fail to report on a case where 
“the use of a GT-200 molecular detector allowed [soldiers from the Mexican Army] to 
locate 26 barrels” of various illegal substances.37 
 
Activism against molecular detectors in Mexico, part I: a ‘sceptical’ blogger against the 
mainstream media 
 
Although newspapers like Reforma, El Universal, Milenio and political magazines like 
Crítica and Proceso have published isolated critical articles on MDs during the past two 
years, these have been few and far in between. Moreover, they have featured little or no 
investigative journalism, except for El Universal. As opposed to the BBC investigations 
for example, press reports in Mexico are generally either rewrites of government-made 
press releases in the worst cases, or second-hand information found in the anti-molecular 
detector blogosphere for the more critical ones. 
 Of primary importance to disseminating the MD scandal has been the El Viaje de 
Lonjho blog by writer and science fiction author Andrés Tonini, whose publications on 
the topic began on 24 February 2009,38 his own work being prompted by warnings about 
the devices found in the English-language blogosphere and in ‘sceptical scientist’ websites 
describing or denouncing the MD frauds (Tonini recalls an article by magician James 
Randi as the first time he heard about bogus detectors). His on-going entries now 
number in the hundreds, and Tonini’s blog is in fact one of the most complete 
repositories of information on molecular detectors on the Internet. Though written in 
Spanish it is constantly referenced by many other anti-MD activist blogs. 
Tonini and other blog collaborators have used social networking service Twitter 
to inform some of Mexico’s most prominent journalists about the molecular detector 
case, with only very minimal success. Tonini describes how out of nearly 60 journalists 
contacted, in addition to around 50 national media outlets, only 2 replies acknowledged 
attention to the messages.39 Though this by itself cannot be taken as anything else than 
anecdotal evidence of the press’s disinterest in the efforts of a lone sceptic, Tonini has 
also consistently monitored the national press’s coverage of the topic quite thoroughly, 
and the lack of information in published media is easy to verify. Tonini has continuously 
blogged about the frustration of having the topic ignored by the national media, though 
notable exceptions such as the previously mentioned newspapers and some commentators 
like TV and radio journalist Denise Maerker’s sporadic coverage do exist.40 But it was in 
fact thanks to Tonini that science populariser Martín Bonfil, who contributes to well-
read Milenio newspaper, wrote the very first critical opinion column in the Mexican 
media. Yet despite brining this topic to a somewhat wider public, Tonini sees these 
sporadic news bits as a greater sign of the anti-MD campaigners’ failure: 
 
The role of the Mexican press has been pathetic. It was only after Bonfil started 
writing in Milenio that the topic started being discussed outside the Internet, but 
if newspaper readers are a small minority in this country, readers of newspaper 
science columns are a minority within this minority, so in practical terms this 
amounted to nothing. […] In fact, not even the front page articles by Laura 
Castellanos in El Universal in October 2011 and in 2012 and by Patricia Dávila 
in Proceso in January 2012 have turned this topic into what it should really be: a 
national scandal. Printed-media readers are a small minority in Mexico and the 
main source of information in Mexico –television– has with very few exceptions 
not only ignored the topic, but in fact highly praised the alleged capabilities of 
these devices.41 
 
Many of Tonini’s blog entries are dedicated to document the apathy shown by the 
Mexican media concerning the MD issue, or its misrepresentation of the controversy. 
When comparing the British and Mexican cases, the difference the media’s effect on the 
molecular detector debate could not be more extreme. While the BBC’s investigative 
journalism directly led to a swift and decisive UK government response in a matter of 
days in what seemed like an obvious response to the report, the overwhelming majority 
of the Mexican media’s compliancy to the official view sits at the opposite extreme. 
However, Tonini also pointed out that in general journalist’s interest in the molecular 
detector frauds even in the UK took years to break into the mainstream and in the US 
case Randi’s frustration ate getting the public interested in the fraud; the BBC story ran 
in 2010, but the fraud had been documented in the British blogosphere since 2006. 
Tonini has published his investigations in a Spanish ‘sceptical’ magazine, but has not ben 
invited to do so in local media.42 
 
Activism against molecular detectors in Mexico, part II: the scientists 
 
The second frontline of criticism against the use of molecular detectors in Mexico came 
from scientists – physicist mostly – but again the differences between the MD 
controversy in Mexico compared to the USA is remarkable when one focuses on the 
participation of scientists at the institutional level. While in the US law enforcement 
agencies actively sought out the skills of Sandia National Laboratory (once the scandal 
was discovered) and the armed forces took the investigation of bogus detector efficacy 
into the hands of their own scientists, in Mexico the recurring position from the local 
governments and military has been to present its own anecdotal evidence of detector 
successes as a proof of the devices’ efficacy. 
The most prominent scientific spokesperson against MDs is physicists W. Luis 
Mochán Backal from the National University of Mexico (UNAM – responsible for 
around half of the scientific research output in the country). Mochán previously achieved 
a brief spell of fame in the Mexican media when he publicly presented his analysis of the 
real-time voting reports of the highly contested 2006 presidential elections, coming to 
the conclusion that the electronically registered voting reports presented via the 
Preliminary Results Programme (PREP) did not correspond to what would be 
statistically expected, which many took as a confirmation of ballot fraud. 
Interviewed for this work, Mochán recounted his first exposure to the MD fraud 
from physicist and ‘sceptical’ science talks: 
 
I was in Atlanta in ’99, in the March meeting of the American Physical Society 
[…] during which there was a big sort of party to celebrate its 100th anniversary 
and as part of the events they invited James Randi to give a talk on scepticism, 
with Michael Schermer and Robert Park; I knew about Randi from ten years 
back when he got involved with the ‘water memory’ issue. […] He talked about a 
lot of frauds he had uncovered, and amongst them he talked about the Quadro 
tracker. 
 
For Mochán the molecular detectors were simply another case of fraudulent science as 
many others Randi referred to in his talk, but almost a decade later this changed when 
the molecular detectors started cropping up closer to home –literally. 
 
In 2010 Bob Park –who was then in charge of communications at the American 
Physical Society– sent me the What’s New newsletter, which deals with scientific, 
policies and frauds like perpetual-motion machines, creationism, etc. In one of 
the weekly notices there was a bit of news about Mexico, saying that Mexico had 
been victim of fraud because they’d purchased these [molecular detector] devices 
which were described exactly as the ones I’d seen before. That left me very 
worried, and I decided I wanted to write something about it, but a long time 
passed and I had a lot of work even though it was still in the back of my mind. I 
talked it over with friends and family, until one day I learnt that in the school 
which is next-door to my own house they actually went in with their GT200, I 
learnt from a neighbour. That made me feel really indignant… and nervous… to 
feel it so close. 
 
Mochán’s involvement in the GT-200 controversy began with an article written for a 
local newspaper in his hometown of Cuernavaca, which features a weekly page devoted to 
a scientific topic in collaboration with the local Morelos Science Academy. Ever the 
activist, Mochán personally began distributing the article to political figures, but 
receiving only one answer from Senator Yeidckol Polevnsky from the left-wing 
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), who was shocked to read about the case,  
thinking at first that it was actually a hoax by Mochán. 
Polevnsky contacted Mochán and offered to personally take the case to the 
Mexican Senate after hearing the details of the controversy. After several months of delay, 
the Senate then asked the opinion of the Scientific Consulting Council of the Presidency 
of the Republic (Consejo Consultivo de Ciencias, or CCC), a body of highly-renowned 
scientists directly advising the President of Mexico on scientific issues of all kinds. The 
CCC then gave its opinion that the MD case was a serious matter that the Senate should 
investigate. The Senate’s Science and Technology Workgroup organized a formal 
meeting with ‘eminent scientific figures’ to meet with the Workgroup on 13 September 
2011. Invited speakers included Mochán, Tonini, Bonfil, Mexican Science Academy 
president Arturo Menchaca, the Director of the UNAM Nuclear Science Research 
Institute Alejandro Franck who acted as a proxy for the head of the CCC, and several 
other physics and engineering researchers from Mexican public universities. 
 Mochán acted as unofficial spokesperson for the scientific community during the 
event. The opinion of all the scientific spokespersons, encapsulated in Mochán’s 
presentation, was unanimous: there was no scientific evidence whatsoever to claim these 
detectors could work based on the physical principles that the manufacturers cited. 
Mochán spoke about the work of James Randi and the international MD scandals, the 
bogus scientific claims made by MD manufacturers along with an analysis of the 
pseudoscientific statements made about the product, and the outline for what constitutes 
a double-blind test. The final talk, given by Tonini, was based on his extensive 
documentary effort, concentrating on the international bans, injunctions, arrests and 
international scandals surrounding the molecular detectors’ parent companies. 
 As a result of the meeting, the Senators in attendance proposed to draw up a 
‘sense of the Senate’ resolution to formally establish the Senate Science and Technolgy 
Workgroup’s agreement with the scientific consensus view that the molecular detectors 
efficacy needed to be scrutinized through double-blind testing immediately, which was to 
be presented before the Senate’s plenary session on the following day. Though this might 
be seen as a successful result of scientific lobbying, a sense of the Senate resolution is non-
binding and carries no legal force.43  
According to the Senate’s webpage, the resolution was presented on 22 
September 2011 to the Senate plenary in a document that outlines the information 
presented at the meeting by the scientific exponents. This draft resolution – drawn up 
naming only three PRD senators present at the meeting – exhorts the head of the federal 
executive power (i.e. President Calderon) “to summon the Mexican scientific community 
in order submit to tests and experiments the GT-200 molecular detectors purchased by 
the Mexican government, and to provide a detailed report about the detector purchases”. 
However, despite the gravity of the detector controversy a formal draft of the resolution 
was not presented to the Senate plenary for full consideration until 30 May, 2012, more 
than 8 months after the meeting. 
The wording of this new resolution was tamer, now only exhorting the President 
and other federal agencies “to evaluate the effectiveness and the functioning of the GT-
200 molecular detectors purchased by the Mexican government”. In fact, there is no call 
for a definite test and much less for an immediate ban of the detectors, but only for 
further “round tables” to be organized in order to discuss the detector efficacy with the 
scientific community. There is also a call for the scientists involved to help draw up a 
double-blind protocol in order to then test the devices, despite the fact that such a 
protocol had in fact been available through Mochán’s personal blog months before and 
had already been used in a double-blind test ordered by a local judge (see below). It was 
not until 6 June that the draft was turned into a formally signed sense of the Senate 
resolution, with the wording limited to the same call for “the organization of workgroups 
with the Mexican scientific community and departments from the federal public 
administration”. 
The resolution ends by noting that it is the CCC’s duty to formally advise the 
Presidency –who is also the head of the Mexican armed forces– concerning technical 
matters, and that the evaluation of the GT-200 should be delegated to it (no mention is 
made of the ADE-651 which during the Senate meeting Tonini had clearly stressed was 
also being used in Mexico).44 To date, the CCC has issued no official documents nor can 
any reference to the molecular detectors be found on its website. Despite the author’s 
attempts to contact the CCC to find out if it was aware of the Senate resolution or if the 
tests had been carried out, no reply to these queries was received either through the 
CCC’s sole electronic-mail contact nor from messages sent to the CCC’s Head 
Coordinator. 
 
Bogus molecular detectors as court evidence 
 
The Mexican press’ position was one of generalized negligence of the molecular detector 
controversy. The executive power and the military under its command has been a 
persistent force of outright denial of scientific opinion. The legislative sector has only 
exhibited an extremely sluggish and ineffective response and the scientific community has 
demonstrated complete apathy at institutional level save for the isolated case of the 
Mexican Academy of Sciences. These three instances of institutional disassociation with 
pressing public issues is sadly all too familiar for anyone aware of the typical working of 
Mexican society and its Kafkian institutions. 
 A few local judiciaries have on the other hand been more positive in attempting 
to probe the controversy and fully take up scientific opinion. In March 2011 Reforma 
newspaper published an article45 in which Menchaca gave his opinion that the molecular 
detectors were fraudulent devices, and upon reading it Mochán decided to contact the 
reporter who then showed some interested in further interviewing Mochán. Mochán was 
contacted by the reporter later that year to give his opinion on the acquisition of several 
detectors by the Mexican Army through the US-Mexico Mérida Initiative anti-narcotic 
cooperation program. The Mobile Trace detector was found by Mochán to indeed be a 
bona fide and scientifically sound explosive trace detector, which he then contrasted to 
the fraudulent GT-200.46 
 Mochán was contacted by the defence attorney of a man who had been detained 
on drug smuggling charges after having been ‘pointed out’ by a bogus detector during an 
Army raid after he read the 16 May Reforma article. Ernesto Cayetano Aguilar, a member 
of the mixe ethnic group, was arrested while riding a bus near the Gulf of Mexico coast 
on 29 January 2011.47 After a canine unit searched the bus, a kilogram of marihuana was 
found inside one of the seats, albeit a few rows ahead of the one that Cayetano was 
actually seating on. Nevertheless, after being ‘pointed out’ by the GT-200 he was 
arrested, strip searched, and was imprisoned for over 8 months awaiting trial. Cayetano 
was fortunate that his case was taken up by a young district judge, who upon scrutinizing 
the accusing arguments based on detector ‘evidence’ decided to rely on scientific opinion 
to judge their efficacy. The attorney first asked Mochán to look at the case 
documentation: 
 
The attorney first sent me the [molecular detector] operator’s statements. Each 
time they capture someone with the detectors, the operator goes before the judge 
and describes how they were walking down such and such street, and then the 
[molecular detector] antenna turned pointing towards such and such place. Then 
after this narration they explain how the detector works. I had eight of these 
explanations at hand, all identical, so obviously it’s just a cut-and-paste text. I 
read it, and it was obviously a fraud. 
 
Mochán then suggested in his ‘expert opinion’ that the proper way to proceed was to 
carry out a test of the experiment and thus empirically prove that the device simply did 
not work. Much to his surprise, he found that was not a strategy likely to be successful: 
 
I told the attorney, “look, this is obviously bogus. What we need is for the judge 
to order a [double-blind] test”. The attorney however explained to me that in 
Mexico a judge will never order such a test unless from the start the judge has an 
argument which contradicts the previous one. So what I did was to analyse the 
molecular detector technical specifications line by line, which I though was 
absurd given what the technical specifications say but I still did it anyway. 
 
Before Mochán’s opinion could be used in full, Cayetano’s attorney had to come up with 
a legal strategy to “draw the judge’s attention” to Mochán as a neutral witness. Mochán 
had to publish an ‘independent report’ of his findings on his own personal blog. 
Amongst the arguments that Mochán gave for finding the detector’s technical 
specification impossible to sustain scientifically were the lack of an external power source 
(the detector is claimed to operate using static electricity produced by the user) and the 
recurrent use of mistaken or plainly wrong scientific terms. In particular, Mochán 
highlighted how the dia- and para-magnetic fields which the detector is supposed to 
locate (these fields are accepted scientific phenomena) are too small to be detected. For 
this Mochán calculated the field strength of a 10kg sample of a ferromagnetic substance at 
10m (ferromagnetic substances produce much stronger fields than dia- or para-magnetic 
ones) which turns out to be around  two orders of magnitude below the Earth’s magnetic 
field strength. For situations set out well within the technical limits in the GT-200 
technical specification (e.g. using paramagnetic substances at kilometres distance when 
only a few nanograms are present) he came to the conclusion that these are around 10-28 
times smaller than the Earth’s magnetic field, and “nobody anywhere could detect this 
even with the most sophisticated equipment available”. Mochán’s report was then 
‘anonymised’ by making no reference to the specific documents used for the evaluation, 
and then then judge ‘discovered’ the report and asked Mochán to use this as actual court 
evidence.48 Mochán was finally called in to court to testify as a certified and credentialed 
scientist and expert and then the judge could use this as evidence to disprove the 
accusation, leading to Cayetano’s release on 3 October 2011 when all charges were 
dismissed. 
Although this story has a positive outcome, other similar cases, some run by the 
same judge, still await ruling. The Mexican Humans Right Commission (CNDH) has 
emitted a formal Recommendation that the molecular detectors should not be used as 
evidence or probable causes for arrest or detentions in either searches or trial. Although 
this recommendation could be seen as a step forward in the anti-MD cause, in fact upon 
closer examination it is no advance for the scientists’ arguments. In its Recomendación 
General No. 19 the CNDH states that the GT-200 is a “device for the detection of drugs, 
weapons and explosives, amongst other substances, which functions using the static 
electricity produced by the human body”. 49  Although the ‘recommendation’ 
acknowledges that foreign governments have branded the detectors as fraudulent, it also 
states that “the fact of it’s being used, independently of its effectiveness or lack thereof, is 
a violation to individuals’ right of privacy in their homes”. This Commission report 
therefore abstains from using the scientific opinion that the detector does not work 
allowing that in fact it may work and still be illegal. CNDH president Raúl Plascencia 
Villanueva later spoke out against the use of the detectors as devices “more fraudulent 
than trustable”, again demonstrating a tepid take-up of the scientific consensus.50 
In another case where the GT-200 was used as evidence by the Army to detain a 
woman on drug-trafficking charges, the judge accepted the defending attorney’s demand 
that the devices be put to stringent scientific tests.51 The judge then had to formally 
demand the Army’s cooperation on five different occasions until her requests were finally 
acknowledged. To test the devices, the judge sough out molecular physicists as expert 
witnesses and contacted Alejandro Ramírez Solís from the local Universidad Autónoma 
del Estado de Morelos (UAEM) to act as an expert witness (perito), a colleague of 
Mochán. Although Ramírez Solís asked the judge to order that one of the devices be 
handed over to be studied directly, the Army denied cooperation in this respect. At 
Mochán’s insistence, the strategy was changed and instead a double-blind test was 
planned where only the Army’s ‘expert users’ would handle the device themselves. 
The judge ordered the test, with the Army also providing samples of substances 
that the GT-200 was claimed to detect. Mochán was called in and was put in charge of 
developing the test protocol in November 2011 at a warehouse at the Mexican Academy 
of Sciences (ironically, the Academy is now housed in the infamous ‘El Partenón’, the 
former palace-mansion of ex- Mexico City police chief Arturo ‘El Negro’ Durazo, who 
was imprisoned on charges of corruption, extortion and cocaine trafficking amidst one of 
the country’s largest political scandals). Mochán explained, 
 
The test itself was very simple, but you have to be careful that you’re not being 
tricked in some way. It has to be double-blind, and that also requires some care. 
Essentially, what you do is you hide the substance and the operator has to find it, 
and then you do a statistical analysis of how many times you hid it and how 
many times it was found, and then you compare it with what would happen in a 
random chance trial. If the difference is significant, then the device works, and if 
it isn’t then the device is useless. The crucial requirement is that the person who 
is looking for the substance cannot communicate with the person who places the 
substance, plus you’ve got to be careful that things are done so no one can accuse 
you that the substance has been contaminated to falsify the test. Therefore 
searcher and the placer have to be from the same ‘team’. 
 
Mochán had access to the GT-200 user manual, and realized that the test was not going 
to be as simple as previously thought. The test manual mentions many reasons why the 
test can fail according to the manufacturers: 
 
The manual gives all sorts of bad excuses for failure. The device always works 
perfectly, but if the user is tired, than it doesn’t work. If the operator is under 
pharmaceutical treatment, it doesn’t work. If the operator is not at ease or is 
nervous, in an agitated state, it doesn’t work, because the operator is the one that 
gives the detector the electrostatic energy for it to work, supposedly. If someone 
else is under pharmaceutical treatment it doesn’t work. The antenna will only 
point in the direction of whatever is being searched for and it can create an 
‘energetic bond’ with whatever substance is closer but it can also be with a sample 
that is far away, so if a neighbor has some medicine in his house then it can falsify 
the reading. There are a thousand and one reasons given why it may not work! 
 
To overcome these limitations, the scientific team proposed that before the actual tests, 
‘calibration runs’ would be set up where the substance to be searched for would be put in 
plain sight of both observers and operators, and the operators would show how indeed 
the device would ‘find’ the substance rendering further falsifying claims mute. 
Because the case has not yet concluded the tests results are still considered as 
evidence in an on-going investigation and Mochán was not comfortable with talking 
about them in detail, but he did say that he was “wholly unsurprised” by the outcome of 
the test. Reports have nevertheless appeared in the press that claim the peritaje (a legally 
sanctioned expert opinion) has shown the detector to be useless. 52  Mochán is also 
currently acting as an expert witness in another similar case where the defendant also 
challenged GT-200 evidence on scientific grounds (though he is still waiting for the 
official court summons to arrive after a half a year’s wait). 
However, in a case reminiscent of the Iraqi and Thai military’s responses, the 
Mexican government’s executive branch (and not only the military as was to be expected) 
has nevertheless refused to back down from its position that the GT-200 is a reliable 
device. The Mexican Attorney General’s office has recently filed an appeal at the 
Supreme Court that challenges the decision to discard the GT-200 as court evidence in 
the first trial Mochán was involved in.53 The Supreme Court has decided to revise the 
challenge hoping to establish binding precedent for similar future cases in order to 
determine “if the data produced by this detector can be considered as evidence in penal 
processes”,54 in what could be the closing chapter in the controversy, at least in the 
judicial arena. 
  
A view from the other side of the controversy: users’ belief in molecular detector 
efficacy 
 
It is not easy to gain direct insight into the Mexican Armed Forces’ perspective on the 
debate, given the present political climate in the country and the connection of the 
molecular detectors with the raging drug wars and national security issues. However, 
several accounts by scientists themselves provide an indirect insight into the matter. 
In his short but incisive presentation during the scntists-Senate meeting, Franck 
briefly discussed his experience of discussing the detectors with Mexican Navy personnel 
who had actually used the detectors in the field.  Franck made an interesting observation, 
that in his opinion MD users definitely did believe that the MDs are a fully trustable 
piece of technology: 
 
I’ve had the opportunity to occasionally talk to personnel from the Mexican 
Navy and I’ve come to realize that they sincerely believe that these devices work. 
The scientific community is not affirming that anyone is acting in bad faith with 
the purchase of this equipment. 
 
When Mochán had the chance to test the detectors alongside Army personnel in the field 
during the AMC tests, he similarly observed that users were genuinely shocked to find 
out the device did not work quite as expected: 
 
Everyone who went to carry out the test was participating with very good will. 
Nobody was really trying to fool us. The [Army] people who were working the 
devices did believe the devices worked at the beginning of the test, and they did 
everything very, very honestly. 
 
At the ground level, it seems a reasonable working hypothesis to assume that the 
detector’s users firmly believe that the devices work. There are also no imminent reasons 
to suspect that the top military ranks do not share this belief to some degree. In the rest 
of this paper I will therefore work under the assumption that users of this technology –
including decision makers in the Mexican armed forces– do believe that the molecular 
detectors do work in earnest. 
 
Discussion 
 
The Mexican molecular detector controversy lends itself to different levels of analysis. It 
is tempting to take it as a particularly simple, open-and-shut case of bad political 
decision-making where the relevant expertise is simply ignored and where user’s 
headstrong beliefs are created through a simple psychological explanation. Thus to 
explain MD users’ strong beliefs on the detector’s efficacy, sceptics and activists 
constantly cite work on the ‘ideomotor effect’, a 19th century term coined by W. B. 
Carter to explain cases of  ‘unexplained’ occult phenomena (e.g. Ouija boards) through 
purely psychological means and which was also investigated by Faraday. In fact, the 
‘ideomotor effect’ explanation is more a part of the ‘sceptical’ culture literature than of 
mainstream science, and there are relatively few references to it in mainstream psychology 
journals. Unsurprisingly, in contrast to their well-constructed scientific arguments on the 
detectors, physicist’s ideomotor ‘explanation’ lacks the solidity of their typical 
argumentative lines. For example, one of the physics sceptics involved in the controversy 
wrote to the author, 
 
What I know about the ideomotor effect I read in 'Paranormality: Why we see 
what isn't there' by Richard Wiseman, where he cites very careful experiments by 
Michael Faraday from the middle of the 19th century. I don’t know any recent 
experiments on the ideomotor effect. Carpenter’s work is considered a 
contemporary classic, but I have not personally read it. I was more interested in 
Faraday’s work because he is the father of electromagnetic induction and of 
electrochemistry.55 
 
Although the explanation of bogus MD belief can certainly be interpreted this way 
without needing much more to back up the explanation, taking up this view only repeats 
some obvious points already raised by the scientists and sceptical activist, mainly that 
policy making should centre on the opinion of those ‘most knowledgeable’ about these 
matters (scientists) and not on users’ pseudo-knowledge or ‘wrong’ inferential claims.  
This position nevertheless leave the explanation of the phenomenon at an 
individual-level psychology that in reality says nothing to us about what is clearly an 
institutionalised belief-system that traces out collective action concerning a particular 
phenomenon. Deeper and sociologically richer question can be asked about the 
controversy. Why is it that in this controversy, scientific expertise has been openly 
ignored? Again, there are easy answers that stem from the ‘obvious’ sceptical discourse: a 
lack of ‘scientific culture’ and ‘scientific illiteracy’ in Mexico, etc. But what do these 
terms actually mean? What is a ‘scientific culture’? How does a lack of it help to explain 
users’ beliefs, institutional positions on the detector controversy, and political authorities’ 
apathy and inaction? Sceptics often point out that ‘scientific culture’ should mean an 
appeal to experiments such as double-blind tests, but how is this position inherently 
scientific and not just plain common sense? 
The first thing to be done in attempting to draw up a sociological answer to these 
questions is to take a very careful look at what has been documented in this paper. On 
first approach, it is tempting to say that policy-makers and army users have ignored ‘the 
science’ behind bogus detectors according to the material presented above. But in fact 
what the Mexican authorities have continuously rejected is individual scientific opinion 
on the matter. Thus Mochán complained: 
 
The Mexican Academy of Sciences has manifested its opinion only through [ex-
president] Arturo Menachaca, never institutionally. The Academy has never taken 
a stance, except when Menchaca sent a letter to the Secretary General of the 
Defence Ministry as President of the AMC, offering the help of the scientific 
community to design a test protocol. (emphasis added) 
 
In another critique of the lack of ‘scientific community’ involvement in the controversy 
he explained: 
 
It is even more troubling that universities have not involved themselves in the 
discussion. I sent a letter to the [UNAM] Consejo Universitario†† [explaining the 
controversy] for consideration and they said, ‘no, no, this sort of opinion is too 
unusual. You’d better make this letter disappear’. I withdrew the letter, but they 
promised that the Consejo Técnico de la Investigación Científica [CTIC]‡‡ was 
going to take up the subject, but they said to me ‘nah, look, it’s better to not 
make a fuss about it. It’s better to negotiate and speak person-to-person with 
these people’. […] The director of the institute I work in talked to the UNAM 
Attorney General about the matter, but the Attorney said the only thing the 
CTIC could do was to suggest a public test, and only that. And nobody would 
accept that, so the best option was to let it die in silence. 
 
As if this position of institutional neglect weren’t enough, Mochán has been explicitly 
warned that at no time should he present his position as that of UNAM – the institution 
– leaving any critique of the detectors merely as the opinion of a lone individual: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
††  The Consejo Universitario [General Assembly] at UNAM is the highest decision-
making body of Mexico’s most prestigious university and has representatives from all 
levels of the UNAM community. As such is not only a collegiate organization but also a 
group with political power. In general, UNAM’s official opinion is extremely important 
in the Mexican political scene, the dean of the University is a major political figurehead, 
and University politics can often be read as thermometers for political topics on the 
entire country. 
‡‡ The Consejo Técnico de la Investigación Científica [CECIT] is a localised version of the 
Consejo Universitario that is restricted to the UNAM scientific research institutes and 
schools. Amongst its institutional objectives is “to establish and publish policies outlined 
in the UNAM scientific subsystem to study the country’s state of being and to propose 
solutions to problems of national interest”, according to its webpage: 
http://www.cic-ctic.unam.mx/cic/consejo_tecnico/acercade_ctic.cfm 
 
It would be trivial to have an institutional position on the subject [through the 
CTIC] instead of the opinion of a lone madman. I’ve been warned, ‘be careful. 
You and only you are responsible for anything you say. That is not what UNAM 
says. Don’t dare to say that is UNAM’s opinion.’ And why the hell should 
UNAM not have an opinion?! Of course I can’t talk for UNAM, but there are 
people who could. Why don’t they do it? That not only makes me feel hopeless, 
it quite angers me. 
 
As has been previously mentioned, the CCC has also abstained from handing out an 
institutional response: 
 
The President of the Consejo Concultivo de Ciencias is a friend of mine. He is 
supposedly a personal advisor to the President and he knows about this matter. 
He could have said, ‘Felipe, c’mon, you’re really screwing up here’, but the 
Presidency has never called up the CCC, and they have never taken the initiative 
to say ‘the CCC has analysed this matter and it is clearly a fraud’. People prefer to 
not make a fuss about it. 
 
Commenting on Mochán’s failures to attract an institutional response from the scientific 
community, Tonini also remarked on the generalised apathy of the from scientists to his 
calls for further involvement: 
 
Sadly, I am not surprised [by the collective response from scientists]. It is a 
symptom of this apathy that the only scientist (or any person with a knowledge of 
physics) that ever replied to me at some point was a Spaniard. Of all the 
Mexicans whom I wrote to, or who through common friends I was able to put 
the data in their hands asking for help to show all the lies behind this 
pseudoscientific nonsense, nobody ever answered. And there were plenty of 
them.56 
 
It is thus not ‘scientific opinion’ that has been ignored at the political level, but rather the 
individual opinion of a few, select scientific experts, albeit highly qualified ones. Though 
this is only one factor amongst many in explaining the development of the controversy, it 
is a very remarkable one. If one sits at the policy-making level, the only thing that one 
has access to is scientific opinion as an individual phenomenon, not scientific knowledge or 
certainty as a social effect. What is really at stake in this case is not the strength of 
scientific certainty at the epistemological level (which the run-of-the-mill Mexican 
politician has no access to) but rather the social strength of collective scientific opinion, 
which in the Mexican context we have seen is null, by the scientific institutions very own 
choosing. 
But Mexican scientific institutions have chosen to be side-lined in this controversy 
is only one of the dimensions of the controversy. I’ve argued that the role of the media as 
a source of social pressure has been one of either ignorance or outright complacency 
towards the official view. Thus a second front of political leverage disappears from the 
controversy at the political level. 
Another point which must necessarily be taken into the account is that in dealing 
with the Armed Forces the individual scientists’ views have clashed with one of the most 
rigid forms of what Goffman (1961) called ‘total institutions’, self-contained social 
systems where the individual inmates’ worldview is moulded on the outset to the closed 
nature of the system. Thus, it is not surprising to read extracts such as the following lines 
from an online BBS populated by Mexican army personnel on a debate concerning the 
GT-200’s use by the military: 
 
Military discipline […] is something that you clearly do not understand. I’ve read 
your posts and even though you think we have ‘blind faith’ [on the detectors] this 
has nothing to do with faith. Military orders always have a reason for being, but 
it is clearly something that only we in the military understand. 
 
In another military-oriented BBS, soldiers constantly reiterate the point that “if the Army 
does it, then it must be right and well-founded”: 
 
With all due respect to fellow users, these [molecular detectors] really do work. If 
the SEDENA, SEMAR, PGR and all other nationwide police forces are using it, 
do you think they really can’t work? 
 
I’m no physicist or a chemist, but the government would not spend so much 
money on devices that don’t work! 
 
In fact, the Infomex and IFAI freedom of information queries gathered by Tonini show 
that although the first two government agencies to purchase the detectors (PEMEX and 
the Mexican Navy) claim to have ‘tested’ the detectors, they refused to give any 
information regarding the way these tests were carried out (Tonini 2010). Tonini also 
found that the rest of the government agencies that have admitted to purchasing the 
devices also admit to not have carried any sort of testing whatsoever. Insofar as can be 
gathered from the available documents and through personal channels the purchases were 
made solely after non-rigorous ‘demonstration’ sessions by the bogus detector marketing 
companies. 
 It seems inconceivable that within the Armed Forces and institutions like 
PEMEX there were no voices that protested against the purchases of the devices, or that 
indeed there was no internal review of the technical characteristics of the devices by 
scientific personnel. The mistakes in the ‘science’ used to support bogus MD claims are 
outrageous enough that any physicist should instantly spot them, and PEMEX, for 
example, is a prime employer of Mexican physicists. In fact, Mochán has personally 
spoken to physicist and engineers working within the Army whose opinions and 
complaints were consulted… and subsequently ignored. He has also spoken to others 
who report similar cases in other sectors of the Armed Forces. When Menchaca offered 
the cooperation of the AMC to SEDENA, the answer followed the same pattern in a 
refusal based on a supposed confidentiality clause in the purchase contract. Likewise, 
Franck is reported to have had his help refused by three different Navy senior officers 
even when extreme discretion was offered (Dávila 2012). Thus while at the lower ranks 
user testimony is clouded by the ‘total institution’ ideology, at the upper ranks we again 
see the weakness of institutional take-up of scientific opinion that cannot be mitigated by 
the lone scientist’s efforts.  
One must also consider the role that outright deception from the fraudulent 
manufacturers must have had on the rigid armed forces which on top of everything we 
find severed from a ‘scientific culture’ – to be understood as a collective phenomenon – 
on top the convicted fraudster’s precise tailoring of the bogus detector marketing schemes 
aimed precisely against these scientifically naïf countries. Moreover, one must also 
question whether there are not some shared ethical responsibilities in role that the UK 
government played in applying only a partial ban and a lukewarm warning against 
devices which it was not willing to allow its own armed forces to use, not to mention the 
fact that the warning only came out when an imminent political scandal was near at hand 
whilst the devices had been denounced through other channels for many years. 
Although it is tempting to aim all blame for the extensive use of these proved 
fraudulent devices at the political decision-makers and the armed forces’ upper echelons, 
it is an inescapable conclusion that a major degree of co-responsibility is shared with the 
Mexican scientific establishment and its weak or null responses to the detector 
controversy. This is, in the end, what constitutes a lack of ‘scientific culture’ in a Third 
World science setting such as Mexico’s: the lack of science as an essential subsystem of 
political decision-making as a whole, (whether willingly, forcedly, or both). But while 
Mexican scientists constantly denounce lack of political willpower and interest as the 
source of Mexico’s continuous under-funding of science and technology sectors (with less 
than 0.5% of its GDP devoted to science and technology spending, Mexico has one of 
the poorest records in this sector for OCDE countries57), the molecular detector case 
showcases how Mexican scientific institutions also take a self-imposed back seat when 
their involvement in crucial social issues is called for. 
 
The bogus MD case as an anomaly for STS analysis 
 
Although the paper presented here is focused as a presentation of the Mexican bogus MD 
case, a few final considerations as to what expertise studies can learn from it are in order. 
As a case study for STS analysis, the Mexican bogus MD case is interesting in that it 
turns on its head the typical case study conditions encountered in the sociology of 
expertise. In canonical expertise studies cases such as those by Epstein (1996), Horst & 
Irwin (2009), Jasanoff (2003) and Wynne (1992) the ‘socially weaker’ expert is always 
the non-scientific layman or the plain citizen. Thus, AIDS patients and sheep-farmers 
naturally need to turn into ‘activists’ in the face of powerful scientific groups to keep the 
science in check, and it is for these activist groups for whom the STS scholar becomes a 
natural voice. While Collins & Evan’s (2007) SEE programme may display a stronger 
stress on science over lay expertise, this starting position is nevertheless still adopted by 
default in their work (see Collins & Evans 2007, Chapter 2). 
 It is not difficult to understand this starting position if one takes a historical 
glance at expertise studies as the successor of what Collins and Evans (2002) refer to as 
the ‘Second Wave’ of STS. The three ‘Waves’ were immersed and reflected wider 
scholarly reactions to science as an institution that gained enormous power and cultural 
importance at the beginning of the 20th century. As science became an autonomous and 
powerful cultural institution, it also became subject to greater public and scholarly 
criticism, culminating in contemporary expertise studies which try to reconcile science 
with wider political preoccupations. Yet in underdeveloped countries like Mexico, this 
historiography of STS is not tied to the development of the country’s scientific 
institutions. As the MD case highlight, science in Mexico does not exist as an institution 
with strong socio-cultural power or resources and it is located well outside the 
mainstream political culture’s considerations. Thus, unlike the ‘typical’ contemporary 
expertise case studies encountered in developed nations where the cases are immersed 
within a social context where science is already solidly anchored to the social system in 
question, one finds that in the MD case the ‘minority’ position is actually that of the 
scientist. In the MD case described above it is in fact the individual scientists, the pro-
science bloggers and the sceptics that need to turn into the relentless activists. Also 
strange in the MD case is that the ‘right’ answer as to what a policy-maker should do in 
deciding whether to use a piece of ‘controversial’ technology is already known 
beforehand. Thus in the Mexican context it is not true that as Collins & Evans (2007, p. 
8) assert, “in general, the speed of politics exceeds the speed of scientific consensus 
formation”, a crucial part of their model of expertise take-up. 
None of the expertise scholars cited above would be able – I believe – to give a 
viable course of action as to how to proceed to resolve the bogus MD case in the political 
context within which it actually develops in Mexico. Although Collins & Evan’s SEE 
program could claim to give the most straightforward answer (i.e. let the expert scientists 
give their verdict on the detectors, then follow their advise) in fact SEE tells us nothing 
about how exactly this should be done given the Mexican ‘abnormal’ socio-political 
context. The case becomes even more complicated if we imagine the situation without 
reference to the MD controversy outside of Mexico itself, that is, in the situation where 
we could not know the ‘right’ answer beforehand. Using Collins & Evan’s (2007, p. 9) 
terminology, it is only because the ‘problem of extension’ and the ‘problem of legitimacy’ 
have been solved for us beforehand that the case seems particularly easy. But apparently, 
for the average Mexican politician the problem has not in fact been solved, and it is in 
this that SEE’s strong roots in developed Western political systems makes it seem directly 
inapplicable to the Mexican case. 
Moreover, although the greatest problem in the MD controversy seems to be the 
sheer ‘irrationality’ of Mexican politicians and public authorities ignoring the relevant 
experts, it is not easy to imagine how one could rule out the experience-based expertise of 
bogus MD detector users without knowing the right answer in advance, which is exactly 
the case the politicians find themselves in. This is of course a problem not only for SEE, 
but also for the other programmes. It is clear – but only because we know the answer – 
that the detector is a fraud, but one should not take this to means that the bogus MD 
users should necessarily be treated as hoaxers, frauds, or confidence tricksters (see Collins 
& Evans p. 54). 
If SEE is to be promoted as a normative decision-making political programme and 
not just an intellectual exercise in these sort of political contexts too, then it is 
unavoidable that considerations of empowerment and power relations must enter the 
analysis in order to understand where the Mexican politician actually stands at when 
making these decisions. What I take to be SEE’s limited capacities to deal with the 
Mexican MD case in situ arises because SEE considers as fundamental to its political 
decision-making normative model a supposition that is simply not applicable to the 
Mexican case: that policy-making is guided first and foremost by an exercise of rational 
choices in which power –relations seemingly have small impact. Ironically, before a 
‘Wave Three’ plateau could be reached in a ‘Mexican expertise model’, what could 
resemble a pseudo-‘Wave One’ position might be first necessary to actually bolster 
scientific institutional status. For it is generally untrue that in Mexico “science and 
technology have become ever more familiar, their ways of assessing evidence bearing a 
disturbing resemblance to everyone else’s ways of assessing evidence” (Collins & Evan 
2007, p. 138-139). In an analysis of Mexican society and its scientific institutions, one 
would first have to deal with the fact that science as a cultural product and ‘scientific 
reasoning’ are very far from the center of social practices at large. 
Adopting a political position concerning science closer to Wave One than Wave 
Two or Three in the Mexican context would need not turn into copying the old 
positivist agenda of putting science in a pedestal above all other cultural products and it 
could include many contemporary STS developments from the very beginning. It might 
be that, quite surprisingly, it is only in combination with some of the ideas found in the 
works by the other expertise scholars quoted above – usually taken to be SEE’s political 
antagonists – that SEE could most easily give a viable political solution for the case at 
hand and other similar controversies without slipping into an out-dated and uncritical 
pro-science stance. In promoting the view of ‘the minority’ through the framing of 
localised power struggles, the ‘anti-SEE’ approaches would necessarily advise that the 
science activists voices be given higher prominence than that given by the Mexican 
authorities. It is thus ironic that, though only by coincidence, the empowerment of 
science that would stem from this political levelling would seem to be the ‘right’ course of 
action at the policymaking level. But this doesn’t show that the ‘anti-SEE’ response is any 
better suited to answer Mexican policymaking questions than SEE itself, as these 
programmes are tailor made not to bolster science, but to bolster the layperson’s view. It 
is only by reconsidering this point because of this particular case’s circumstances (and 
thus ironically adopting a position significantly closer to SEE) that such a 
recommendation would make sense. The irony in this possible anti-SEE answer only 
highlights the highly anomalous nature of the MD case for contemporary STS 
frameworks once more, in a case that develops wholly outside of the world of Western 
institutionalised science and cannot be treated using formulas tailored made for a social 
system where science starts from a position of power ab initio. 
Mexico’s upside-down and rather unfortunate version of political rationality is a 
reflection of its wider socio-cultural conditions, perhaps in what led a frustrated André 
Breton exasperated by the city’s chaotic conditions to say of the Mexican capital city in 
1938, “our art is not needed in this country”. 
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